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The Occupation of Iraq: A Reassessment

Eyal Benvenisti and Guy Keinan*
I. Introduction

T

he invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in 2003 provided a rare opportunity to examine the viability in the twenty-first century of a legal doctrine
rooted in the military and political circumstances of the nineteenth century.1 The rarity of this opportunity is not a result of paucity of occupations, but of the prevalent disinclination of occupants to recognize their status as such.2 This article reflects on
several key questions concerning the occupation of Iraq, not in an attempt to evaluate
the occupants for their compliance with the law, but rather to study contemporary
challenges to the law and possibilities for adaptations in the twenty-first century. The
article addresses the beginning and end of the occupation in Iraq and potential preand post-occupation responsibilities (Part II), and examines the scope of authority of
the occupants and of the UN Security Council in Iraq (Part III). Part IV concludes.
II. The Time Frame of the Occupation in Iraq
The Beginning: When Was Iraq Occupied?
Background: When Does Occupation Begin?
This seemingly straightforward question has proven to be quite complex. It has always been complex, but for different reasons. In the nineteenth century, the
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The Occupation of Iraq: A Reassessment
concern was that eager invaders would declare an area occupied prematurely. Because the law of occupation granted occupants control over key strategic resources,
such as public property, invaders might be tempted to assert authority without actually controlling the area.3 But over the years, and most notably since the adoption
of Geneva Convention IV, which imposed on occupants extended obligations over
civilians in occupied territories, and several human rights conventions that added
to those obligations, occupants found little interest in asserting their status as occupants. The derogatory connotation that the term “occupation” has gained, particularly during the second half of the twentieth century, added to this reluctance.
Moreover, the asymmetric nature of many of the recent conflicts has provided another incentive for the occupant to act through intermediaries or otherwise minimize its contact with particularly violent indigenous communities. Therefore,
while the drafters of the original text on occupation law were concerned about
overly assertive occupants, today’s interpreters have to deal with occupants who try
to evade this designation. With contemporary technology and weaponry that enables certain armies to control an area from a distance, a new challenge to the definition emerges.
Given the occupants’ increasing ability and prevailing interest to control an area
but not its population, it is important to note that the governing legal definitions
seek to preclude this option and insist on the protection of individuals. The Hague
Regulations emphasize the territorial test,4 implying that whoever controls the territory has responsibility over the population, while Geneva Convention IV does
not attempt a territorial definition, instead emphasizing the relations between the
occupant and the “protected persons” who “find themselves . . . in the hands” of an
occupying power5 as the relevant test.
Some confusion, however, arises from the second sentence of Article 42 of the
Hague Regulations, which stipulates that “[t]he occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” This addition can at first sight be interpreted as suggesting that an occupant that manages to
control only the land, but does not actually exercise authority over the civilian population, is freed from responsibility toward it. This reading is plainly wrong. It is
wrong because the text was intended to exclude premature occupations, rather than
to allow occupants to evade their responsibilities.6 It is wrong also literally, because
the reference in “such authority” is to the first sentence of the article, which discusses
authority over territory, not over the population in the territory.7 Finally, it is wrong
because it lets occupants off the hook of responsibility toward the population. The
better interpretation of the test for occupation therefore stipulates that occupation
begins when the foreign army is in actual control over enemy territory, and is in a
position to establish, if it so wishes, an authority of its own over the population. It is
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irrelevant whether or not the army actually does so. By assuming control over the
land the occupant assumes responsibility over the population situated on that land.8
The same confusion is reflected in some States’ military manuals. Whereas the
German military manual accurately requires merely a potential to actually exercise
authority,9 the US military manual insists that the test for occupation is that the
“invader has successfully substituted its own authority for that of the legitimate
government in the territory invaded.”10 To add confusion, the British manual apparently contains an internal contradiction, as it appears to support both views. On
the one hand, it stipulates that “the occupying power [must be] in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the former government” (paragraph 13.3), but
later it indicates that occupation “depends on whether authority is actually being
exercised over the civilian population.”11 In this confusing mist, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) adopted the “actual authority” test in the Armed Activities
case.12 Except for one district, where actual authority had been established and
hence was regarded by the Court as occupied, the ICJ accepted Uganda’s argument
that in other areas it controlled only land, not people, and therefore did not “occupy” them.13 In other words, in the ICJ’s view, only direct authority over a population amounts to occupation. This is an unfortunate outcome.14 It is unfortunate
from the perspective of the local population, which is left with no accountable government in charge. It is also unfortunate from the perspective of neighboring
States that are weary of geographical areas left without responsible State authority.
An invader that is unaccountable for what transpires in an area it dominates is
likely not to internalize the dangers emanating from the invaded territory, and, as a
result, that area may become a source of regional, if not global, instability.
The Occupation of Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom
It is quite obvious that the initial planning for the invasion of Iraq did not include
plans to establish military administration whose authority would derive from the
law of occupation. Months before the invasion, which began on March 20, 2003,
officials in the US administration had been divided on the applicability of the law
of occupation. While some of them believed it was appropriate, others viewed the
situation not as occupation, but as mere “liberation.”15 Even after parts of Iraq had
already been occupied and Baghdad was falling, President Bush and Prime Minister
Blair emphasized this liberating role of their coalition and envisioned “the formation of an Iraqi Interim Authority, a transitional administration, run by Iraqis, until a permanent government is established by the people of Iraq.”16 Military
officials still refused to speak of occupation in the legal, rather than colloquial,
sense, and maintained that “occupation” in the legal sense required taking over an
area “with the intent to run the government in that area,”17 which, at the time, was
265
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not the case for the coalition forces in Iraq. But British jurists had a different view
from the start. In a secret memorandum from late March, the British Attorney
General, Lord Goldsmith, wrote that the United States and the United Kingdom
would be bound by the law of occupation, unless the Security Council passed a specific resolution.18
These differences of opinion were reflected in a gradually changing attitude on
the ground. The initial institution entrusted with administering occupied Iraqi territory was the US Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA), established two months before the ground invasion.19 During the initial
phase of the occupation, despite a late March Security Council resolution that had
reminded coalition forces of an occupying power’s responsibilities,20 the coalition
forces made efforts to set up an indigenous Iraqi regime. On April 15, Coalition officials held a meeting with Iraqi representatives in Nasiriyah, in which a thirteenpoint statement on the political future of Iraq was adopted.21 Together with a subsequent meeting, which took place on April 28 in Baghdad, these were part of “initial moves towards the establishment of a national conference, which could set up
an interim authority and make progress towards constitutional change and the
election of a new government.”22 But on April 16, only one day after the Nasiriyah
meeting, without an explanation or a formal document setting it up,23 the head of
the ORHA announced the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA). Another three weeks passed until on May 8 the UK and US representatives
to the UN sent a letter recognizing their obligations under the Hague Regulations
and Geneva Convention IV.24 L. Paul Bremer was appointed the US presidential
envoy to Iraq on May 6 and the CPA Administrator on May 13.
The legal situation crystallized during the month of May as the occupying powers
began seeking to establish their own government instead of setting up an interim
Iraqi government. To do so they had to rely on authority under international law.
While they did not explicitly acknowledge their status as occupants, they impliedly
acknowledged the applicability of the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention
IV to their actions in Iraq. Explicit recognition of occupation law came later, when
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office relied on it expressly,25 as did
American legal advisors stationed in Iraq.26
Security Council Resolution 1483, of May 23, 2003, clarified the legal status of
Iraq at the time. The Resolution “noted” the May 8 letter of the UK and US representatives, but continued to “recogniz[e] the specific authorities, responsibilities,
and obligations under applicable international law of these States as occupying
powers under unified command” (emphasis added).27 The Resolution further
“[c]all[ed] upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under
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international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
Hague Regulations of 1907.”28
But this was not meant to be a casebook example of occupation, because the occupants sought a broad Security Council mandate that went beyond the scope of
authority recognized by international law.29 The UN’s role was meant to widen the
authority of the CPA, while being instrumental—but without formal authority—
in offering humanitarian relief and assistance to the CPA in the reconstruction of
Iraq and the establishment of institutions for representative governance.30
Pre-occupation Responsibilities?
The traditional reading of the laws of armed conflict distinguishes between the
hostilities and the post-hostilities phases. This distinction is also reflected in the
different sections of the Hague Regulations. However, such a neat distinction can
be questioned. As Dinstein notes, “[i]t is impossible to pinpoint an instant marking transition from an extended foray to a fledgling belligerent occupation.”31 Instead, it is possible to recognize the simultaneous applicability of both in bello and
post bellum norms with respect to the obligations an enemy army has toward the
local population.32 Although it is beyond the scope of this article to explore this
question in depth,33 it can be noted that the obligations toward the population in
enemy territory arise even before the establishment of firm control over territory
and population. Given contemporary technology and weaponry, on the one hand,
and the proliferation of weak or failing indigenous regimes, on the other, the neat
allocation of responsibilities between occupant and occupied based on physical
control of territory (“boots on the ground”) does not serve humanitarian and
global interests. It is necessary to impose legal restraints on any foreign power that
effectively controls activity in a foreign area, even without having actual presence
in the territory in the ancient form of full-fledged military administration. There is
thus a need to redefine the rules of allocating responsibilities. The most sensible
one would seem to be a rule that interprets authority as “power” (rather than “control”
or “jurisdiction”), to be determined based on the consequences of the actual exercise of power in a given territory. A State that exercises its power in a foreign ungoverned or partly governed land will thus be regarded as bearing at least the basic
obligations borne by an occupant.
This implies that pre-occupation obligations toward the local population need
to be recognized, and they can derive, inter alia, from the obligations under
Geneva Convention IV toward people who “find themselves . . . in the hands” of
the invading army.34 It would be ridiculous to suggest, for example, that Article 49
of that Convention, which proscribes deportations of enemy civilians, would be
inapplicable unless the area has been occupied.35 Similarly senseless would be the
267
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interpretation that only armies that actually substitute for the ousted government
in a foreign territory are required to provide food and shelter to persons protected
by Geneva Convention IV.
In the context of Iraq such questions were pertinent also to the failure to protect
against looting. As in previous situations of invasions (e.g., Panama in 1989),36
widespread looting followed the invasion and occupation of Iraq. On April 10,
2003, only one day after the fall of Baghdad to coalition forces, looting was already
in progress.37 But in Iraq the looting affected also art treasures and important archeological artifacts. The National Museum in Baghdad, for instance, lost around
15,000 artifacts.38 Note that the Hague Convention on Cultural Property (1954)39
obliges State parties40 “to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties.”41 The Convention formally amplifies these duties during occupation, but they arguably
apply also before the occupation stage.42
The End of Occupation
When Does Occupation Cease?
The occupation ends whenever the conditions of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations are no longer fulfilled.43 Under the test of actual control, an occupation ends
when the occupant no longer exercises its authority in the occupied territory. Under the test of potential control, the occupation ends when the occupant is no longer capable of exercising its authority. It is generally accepted that occupation
continues as long as the occupying force can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the occupied area.
In other words, an occupation ends as a result of the armed return of the
ousted government, an indigenous uprising or a unilateral occupant withdrawal
or as part of a peace agreement. The “legal oddity”44 that is Article 6(3) of Geneva
Convention IV does not affect the end of occupation. Although it stipulates that
“the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general
close of military operations,” it does not regard the area as no longer occupied, and
considers the occupant as bound by significant portions of the Convention,45 as
well as the Hague Regulations.46
A rather problematic question arises when the occupant transfers authority to
an indigenous government that has no link to the ousted government. The law
looks at such transfers with suspicion, because the concern is that the indigenous
government might not be representative of the indigenous population and might
be nothing but a puppet regime of the occupant. It is also worried about the
commitment of the indigenous regime to respect the rights of the occupied
268
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population.47 This is the challenge of what Roberts calls “transformative occupations,” namely “occupations [that] aim at establishing a political order based on
the principle of self-government.”48 In such occupations,
determining at what point one can say that the transformation has been achieved, and
the government of the occupied territory is in a position to exercise the powers of
sovereignty, is genuinely difficult. . . . Where what is involved is a gradual transfer of
powers to the indigenous authorities as their capacity to govern is built up, there is
bound to be an arbitrary element in fixing on a single date as the symbolic ending of the
occupation.49

Based on policy reasons and State practice, it can be said that “[t]he ultimate test
for the legality of a regime installed by an occupant, is its approval in internationally monitored general elections, carried out without undue delay.”50
The End of Occupation in Iraq
Although occupation is a matter of fact, its legal status can be subject to the determination of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter as
the ultimate arbiter of the law. Therefore, since Security Council Resolution 1546
stipulated that “by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty,”51
in the eyes of the law the occupation formally came to a close by June 30 despite the
fact that the coalition forces were still exercising administrative authority in certain
areas of Iraq.52
The discrepancy between the UN declaration on the reassertion of full Iraqi sovereignty and the actual state of affairs derives from the fact that at that point in time
the fledgling Iraqi government was the construct of the occupation authority and
was yet to be endorsed by a valid act of self-determination. Such an endorsement,
which ended the occupation not only from the formal perspective, occurred only
after the interim government of Iraq assumed full authority.53
Post-occupation Responsibilities?
If occupants may have pre-occupation responsibilities, they may be equally subject
to post-occupation responsibilities to the extent that they continue to exert authority in the foreign territory. The previous occupant could also be responsible for
ameliorating conditions it created in the previously occupied territory.54
Traditionally, in post-occupation situations, when former occupants were requested by the newly installed governments to maintain some authority, such authority was deemed to derive from the sovereigns’ authorization, and hence was
beyond the scope of the law of occupation. But this traditional view could be
269
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revisited. There may be sufficient ground to argue that even while exercising authority on the behest of an indigenous government, the entity that acts must
comply with the international obligations to which it is bound. This is likely to be the
case under international human rights law when the actor exercises authority over
individuals who are under its control. This is also the case under international humanitarian law that stipulates minimal standards of treatment55 under the national
law of several countries.56
Such a view seems to find support in two recent judgments, related to the British occupation and post-occupation practices in Iraq. In the Al-Jedda case, the
House of Lords ruled that even if the United Kingdom had been operating in Iraq
on the UN’s behalf (i.e., not as an occupant), it was still subject to its human rights
obligations to the extent possible. As Lord Bingham noted, the United Kingdom
could detain persons as authorized by the Security Council, “but must ensure that
the detainee’s rights . . . are not infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in
such detention.”57 The same logic could apply to the post-occupation forces present in Iraq. More recently, the United Kingdom maintained that after the end of
formal occupation, the British Army was merely an “executor” of decisions of
Iraqi courts. Since prisoners were detained and transferred by the United Kingdom at the request of the Iraqi courts, the United Kingdom argued it did not exercise “any recognised extra-territorial authority.”58 The European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), however, refused to regard that relationship between the British
and the Iraqi government as one that excludes the applicability of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court’s jurisdiction. The gist of
the idea is simple and convincing: acting under instructions of others cannot and
does not relieve one of one’s international obligations.
III. The Authority of the Occupants in Iraq
The Transformative Nature of the Occupation
Aiming to create a market-based democratic Iraq, the occupying powers introduced major administrative and legislative changes. These changes related not
only to public order and security, to the “de-Ba’athification of Iraqi society,” the
overhauling of Iraqi criminal law and the judicial system, but also to areas often
untouched during occupation, such as trade law,59 company law,60 securities law,61
bankruptcy law,62 and even intellectual property63 and copyright laws.64 The reasons usually given for these reforms were the need to promote human rights, efficiency, modernization and compliance with international standards. Because
these reasons sometimes deviate from the traditional law of occupation, scholars
referred to the occupation as “transformative.”65 This section reviews some of the
270
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more controversial changes introduced by the CPA. The subsequent section evaluates their compatibility with international law.
Among the many reforms taken by the occupants, it was the economic legislation that attracted the most criticism. Was it lawful, appropriate and needed to replace “all existing foreign investment law,”66 to rewrite securities law almost
completely,67 to suspend all customs duties and tariffs,68 and to profoundly change
corporation law in a way that allows foreign citizens to acquire membership in
companies?69 The CPA sought to explain the motivation of these and other sweeping economic reforms by emphasizing indigenous endorsement. A key player in
this indigenous participation was the Iraqi Governing Council, a “principal bod[y]
of the Iraqi interim administration” established by the CPA on July 13, 2003.70 The
CPA emphasized that it “worked closely with the Governing Council to ensure that
economic change occurs in a manner acceptable to the people of Iraq,”71 and reiterated that the change was made “[i]n close consultation with and acting in coordination with the Governing Council.”72 In fact, the CPA attributed the foreign
investment initiative to “the Governing Council’s desire to bring about significant
change to the Iraqi economic system.”73
The CPA also relied on the UN authorization as an independent source of authority. Practically all orders issued by the CPA contained a preambular paragraph
stressing their consistency with the laws and usages of war, as well as with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The CPA additionally relied on the report of the
Secretary-General, which concerned “the need for the development of Iraq and its
transition from a non-transparent centrally planned economy to a market economy characterized by sustainable economic growth,”74 and often emphasized that
it had “coordinated with the international financial institutions, as referenced
in . . . U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483.”75
Moreover, great efforts were made to show how the reforms would benefit Iraqi
society. For example, the goal of foreign investment reforms was to “improve the
conditions of life, technical skills, and opportunities for all Iraqis and to fight unemployment with its associated deleterious effect on public security.”76 The CPA
saw itself obligated to “ensure the well being of the Iraqi people and to enable the
social functions and normal transactions of every day [sic] life.”77
The CPA didn’t stop there. Economic modernity, fairness, efficiency, transparency, predictability and independence were invoked as justifications for
several reforms.78 Long-term policies were also mentioned: at one point, the CPA
noted “the demonstrated interest of the Iraqi Governing Council for Iraq to become a full member in the international trading system, known as the World Trade
Organization.”79
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The Lawfulness of the CPA Measures under International Law
The transformation of Iraq from a centralized dictatorship into a market-based democracy raised questions about the scope of authority of the CPA under international law. Some in the CPA really thought that the law of occupation allowed such
wide-ranging reforms.80 But British officials differed.81 More generally, the British
government distinguished “between direct positive acts of government and . . . the
facilitation of plans and efforts of the nationals of the occupied territory for the
development of governmental institutions,”82 with only the latter being deemed
permissible under occupation law.83 To make reforms that go beyond the law of
occupation, they maintained, “further authority in the form of a Security Council
resolution would be required.”84 According to this view, with Security Council
Resolution 1483 as the additional basis for the reforms, “the question of the UK’s
responsibilities in respect of political reform is no longer governed solely by the law
of occupation.”85 Later the British discovered that they were expected to comply
also with their international and European human rights obligations. As a consequence, in the occupation of Iraq there were three bodies of law—occupation law,
human rights law and UN law—at play. This section analyzes the outcome.
Authority under the Law of Occupation
We begin with a succinct analysis of the scope of authority under the law of
occupation. The request for authorization from the Security Council implies an
acknowledgment of the limited authority granted to occupants under traditional
occupation law. A textual reading of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations easily supports the conclusion that the occupant is bound by what Gregory Fox named “the
conservationist principle.”86 The call for conservation of the status quo ante bellum
is reflected in the admonition that the occupant has but de facto authority (whereas
the ousted government is still the “legitimate power”) in the restricted scope of authority “to restore, and ensure” public order and civil life, and in the obligation to
respect the laws in force in the country “unless absolutely prevented.”87
The term “unless absolutely prevented” was inserted during the First Peace
Conference in 1899 to replace the term “unless necessary” at the insistence of the
potentially occupied States to emphasize the occupant’s obligation to also preserve
the status quo in the legal sphere.88 Whether this insertion was prudent is a different question. The restraint on the occupant’s authority necessarily creates a tension with its authority and obligation to ensure public order and civil life. This
restraint was significantly diluted by Article 64 of Geneva Convention IV, which
replaced the negative test of “unless absolutely prevented” with a positive authorization for the occupant, which “may subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its
272

Vol 86.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 86\_Ventura\Vol 86.vp
Monday, May 24, 2010 11:46:55 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Eyal Benvenisti and Guy Keinan
obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of
the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power.” The duties of the
occupant under Geneva Convention IV are far more numerous than those stipulated
in the Hague text. The Geneva text envisions the occupant no longer as the disinterested watch guard, but instead as a very involved regulator and provider.89
Scholars in the post–World War II period readily conceded legitimate subjects for
the occupant’s lawmaking other than military necessity. The welfare of the population was deemed a worthy goal for the occupant to pursue.90 Such an expansive view
seems to be consonant with the prevalent view that the occupant is bound also by human rights obligations, and that in general it must “take measures to ensure respect
for human rights and international humanitarian law in the occupied territories.”91
The parallel applicability of international and, for the British troops, European
human rights law raises additional questions regarding the authority of the occupants and the adequacy of the conservationist principle. It is beyond the scope of
this article to explore the questions concerning the applicability of international
and European human rights law to occupied territories, and the relationships between occupation law and human rights law. Still, international treaty bodies and
tribunals,92 as well as the majority of scholars,93 are of the opinion that human
rights law applies to occupied territories. The consequences of this parallel application would seem to support a modification of the conservationist principle when
changes are necessary to ensure the enjoyment of human rights by the occupied
population.94
Reflecting on the occupation of Iraq as a “transformative occupation,” Adam
Roberts noted that “occupying powers can justify certain transformative policies
on the basis that these are the best way to meet certain goals and principles enshrined in international human rights law.”95 More generally, Roberts believes human rights conventions “can play an important role” in occupations, as they “may
impose formal obligations on parties; be instrumental in political debate, as a basis
for assessing the actions of external powers and local actors; provide legal procedures for taking action; or serve as one basis for pursuing transformative goals.”96
Other scholars accept this view with some insignificant nuances.
A particularly strong case can be made for extensive authorization to introduce
significant changes in an occupied territory that had been governed by an unrepresentative regime that enjoyed little or no domestic support after being ousted
by the occupant. The underlying premise of the law of occupation is, as was seen,
that the legitimate power in the country retains the right to revert to its ante bellum
position, unless it agrees to territorial changes. But when this power has already
taken its last breath, or when its source of authority is contested by the indigenous
population exercising its right to self-determination, the only legitimate power
273
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that seems relevant is the people itself and not the ousted regime. This is a situation where the “reversioner” is the people, and the occupant must take its interests
and wishes, rather than those of the ousted regime, into account.97 Such an argument can support the dismantling of the Ba’athist regime, which is evident in the
CPA’s first-ever legislative act, aptly titled “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.”98
But it is important to keep in mind that even in such instances, reforms introduced by the occupant—as beneficial to the local population as they may be—are
subject to the principle of self-determination. This principle may be “meaningful
for the post-occupation society” only by refraining from making “overbroad systemic changes.”99 There is, therefore, ground to argue that the law of occupation,
whether alone or together with the law on self-determination and human rights
law, gave the occupants in Iraq a wide margin of discretion.100
It is noteworthy that the two occupants of Iraq did not wish to found their
transformative occupation on their human rights obligations. In fact, they both rejected the applicability of human rights law in Iraq.101 The US government has
claimed that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights102 does not
apply outside its territory or during an international armed conflict.103 In the midst
of the Iraq conflict, the United States expressed its “firm belief” that humanitarian
law is a “well-developed area of law conceptually distinct from international human rights law,” and that the two cannot apply simultaneously.104 The United
Kingdom, as a party to the ECHR, had to face numerous petitions in relation to the
ECHR’s applicability in Iraq, and offered several reasons why it was not bound by
that treaty105—reasons that did not impress the British courts106 or the ECtHR.107
Authority under Security Council Resolution 1483
Security Council Resolution 1483 provided the framework for the coalition’s actions in Iraq. On the one hand, it endorsed its authority over Iraq and the Iraqi people, and, on the other hand, it delineated the legal constraints and guidelines that
this authority was bound by, namely “the Charter of the United Nations and other
relevant international law,”108 and other “obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations
of 1907.”109 The President of the Security Council emphasized that the powers delegated by the Resolution “are not open-ended or unqualified,” and should be exercised “in conformity with the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations.”110
Concurrently, however, the Resolution clearly endorsed the transformative course
of action that the CPA embarked upon immediately. The occupants, referred to as
the “Authority” in the Resolution, are
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[c]all[ed] upon . . . consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant
international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective
administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration
of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi
people can freely determine their own political future . . . .111

Furthermore, Resolution 1483 created a new position, the “Special Representative
for Iraq,” which would be independent of the occupying power and whose tasks
would include assisting the people of Iraq, coordinating the activities of the United
Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and with international agencies engaged
in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and promoting
the protection of human rights.112
How should one read this Resolution? Does it endorse an expansive view of the
law of occupation, or does it form an independent source of authority on the
strength of Chapter VII law? Indeed, there are three possible interpretations of Resolution 1483. According to the first reading, the Resolution endorses an expansive
reading, influenced by human rights law, of the occupant’s authority under the law
of occupation. A slightly different interpretation of the Resolution would suggest
that the expansive reading of the occupant’s powers applies only to the unique circumstances of Iraq as opposed to all other occupations. The third possible interpretation of the Resolution would be that the Resolution gave the occupants
additional authority to transform Iraq that they would not have had otherwise. As
mentioned above, at least British officials relied on the latter interpretation, having
concluded that the law of occupation as such stopped short of granting them extensive authority.
In these authors’ view, Resolution 1483 relates, of course, only to the specific
situation in Iraq, but at the same time it signals an endorsement of a general view
that regards modern occupants as subject to enhanced duties toward the occupied population and therefore also having the authority to fulfill such duties.
“The call to administer the occupied area ‘effectively’ acknowledges the several
duties that the occupants must perform to protect the occupied population. It
precludes the occupant from hiding behind the limits imposed on its powers as a
pretext for inaction.”113 Indeed, an evolutionary reading of the law of occupation
in an era heavily informed by human rights concerns cannot reach a different
conclusion.114
This interpretation is based not only on the Resolution or the evolutionary interpretation of the law of occupation. It is also based on the authority of the Security Council when acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This authority is
not limitless but subject at least to compliance with jus cogens.115 One of the central
jus cogens norms is the right of peoples to self-determination. 116 The law of
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occupation internalizes a delicate balance between conflicting interests of occupant and occupied, and is heavily influenced by the effort not to alienate the indigenous people’s right to continue to exercise its right to self-determination.117 The
law of occupation has always been intimately linked to the concept of national sovereignty. “Indeed, the evolution of the concept of occupation can be seen as the
mirror-image of the development of the concept of sovereignty.”118 Therefore,
authorizing an occupant to derogate from its responsibilities under the law of occupation and thereby limit and shape the political choices of an occupied sovereign
people carries the danger of effectively infringing the right to self-determination,
which might be beyond the authority of the Council.119
Obviously, not every limitation of the right to self-determination is an impermissible infringement of a jus cogens right. There may be solid reasons to interfere
in the exercise of the right to self-determination to ensure that the process is practical, inclusive and fair. It is also reasonable to argue that the Security Council is
more trustworthy than the occupant to be entrusted with such a complex matter,
and therefore it may be granted the authority to limit or influence the exercise of
the right to self-determination to a greater extent than the occupant would, as is the
case in territories directly administered by the UN.120 The Security Council is
clearly less prone to bias than the occupant, if only because of its diverse composition and lack of immediate interest.121 It therefore makes eminent sense to recognize that the Security Council would have the authority under Chapter VII of the
Charter to authorize the transformation of a regime under occupation beyond
what the law of occupation would otherwise allow, but this could not be an
unfettered discretion delegated to interested parties without monitoring them. If
the Security Council wished to extend such an authorization to the occupant, it
would have to remain closely involved, through ample supervisory mechanisms,
effectively approving and reviewing the actual transformation process. Because
such mechanisms were not employed in the case of Iraq, the CPA having acted with
limited monitoring by the Council,122 one could understand its attitude either as
carelessness that bordered on infringement of its jus cogens obligations or as a reflection of its general attitude toward the occupant’s powers under the law of
occupation.
IV. Conclusion: The Legacy of the Occupation of Iraq
The occupation of Iraq raises a host of questions beyond the scope of a single article.
In addition to questions regarding the timing of the occupation, pre- and postoccupation responsibilities, and the scope of authority of the occupant in
transformative occupation, the occupation of Iraq gave rise to queries regarding the
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definition of protected persons123 and the proper interpretation of Article 49 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention,124 in addition to the proper treatment of detainees and
the responsibility for their shameful abuse. The management by the occupants of
public property, including natural resources such as oil and freshwater, was also subject to legal analyses.125 Overall it is almost astounding to observe how a nineteenthcentury doctrine that during the last half century almost reached the stage of desuetude
due to lack of adherence was suddenly revived in unanticipated circumstances.
Critics could argue that its invocation was nothing more than an afterthought, a
sort of “Plan B” that was put in motion after the effort to install a “genuine” indigenous regime failed. Nevertheless, the doctrine was there ready to be applied,
flexible enough to be adapted to twenty-first-century contemporary circumstances
and challenges, as well as current legal and political perceptions.
Resolution 1483 marks the first time the Security Council resorted to the concept of occupation to describe, authorize and delimit the authority of foreign
troops in control of enemy territory. The recognition of the applicability of the law
on occupations refuted the claim that occupation, as such, is illegal, and revived the
neutral connotation of the doctrine, at least from a legal perspective. At the same
time, the broad mandate recognized by the Security Council as pertaining to the
occupants to transform Iraq into a market-based democracy, although commendable and probably lawful under UN Charter law, also tested the limits of the law of
occupation and the Security Council’s own authority to shape the way the Iraqi
people exercised their inalienable right to self-determination.
Notes
1. On the history of the law of occupation, see Eyal Benvenisti, The Origins of the Concept of
Belligerent Occupation, 26 LAW & HISTORY REVIEW 621 (2008); Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of
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which the DRC Government would have needed to re-establish its authority, Uganda had effective, and thus factual, authority” (first emphasis added)).
9. Federal Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, ZDv 15/2, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts: Manual ¶ 526 (1992) (“[T]he occupying power must be able to actually exercise its authority” (first emphasis added)).
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PRACTICE SINCE 1945, at 597 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008); Adam Roberts, Transformative
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(ICTY) Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Naletili & Martinovi, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment,
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period, with less protection than that attached to them once occupation is established”).
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ARMY IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, MAY 2003–JANUARY 2005, at 55 (2008), available at
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14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 373,
available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/400?OpenDocument [hereinafter Hague Convention on Cultural Property].
40. The Convention is relevant to the Iraq war assuming the Convention, which currently
has 123 parties, is customary law. When the war began, the United States and the United Kingdom were merely signatories (US ratification came on March 13, 2009); Iraq was a party.
41. Hague Convention on Cultural Property, supra note 39, art. 4(1).
42. The occupant is required to “support the competent national authorities of the occupied
country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property” and “take the most necessary measures of preservation” (id., art. 5). Since lootings often erupt in the post-invasion, pre-occupation
phase, it is sensible to give cultural property a higher degree of protection, usually pertinent in
occupations, and oblige the invading power to actively secure art, archeology and similarly endangered resources.
43. For these conditions see pp. 263–64 supra, as well as the ICTY’s determination in
Naletili & Martinovi, supra note 35, ¶ 215. See also Prosecutor v. Kordi & erkez, Case No. IT95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 338–39 (Feb. 26, 2001).
44. The “one year after” rule probably never reflected customary law but was instead understood as a specific reference to the post-WWII occupations in Germany and Japan. Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967, 84 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44, 57 (1990) (“In general, the ‘one year after’ provision of
1949 must be viewed as a legal oddity”). Professor Bothe and his fellow authors say:
Article 6(3) of the Fourth Convention . . . was a special ad hoc provision for certain
actual cases, namely the occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II. There is
no reason to continue to keep in force such provisions designed for specific historic
cases. In 1972 the majority of government experts expressed a wish to abolish these time
limits.
MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON
THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 59 (1982).
According to Article 3(b) of Additional Protocol I, occupation law ceases to apply “on the
termination of the occupation.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 422. The ICJ
referred to Article 6(3) as relevant in the Wall advisory opinion (Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,
185 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion]), but it is widely accepted that this reference
was seriously flawed. See Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties
Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, 134 (2005); Roberts, supra note 15, at 597; Ardi Imseis, Critical
Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, 99
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 102, 105–9 (2005).
45. This is clear from the text of Article 6(3) itself, which reads:
[I]n the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease
one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power
shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power
exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the
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following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59,
61 to 77, 143 [emphasis added].
In other words, occupation continues, but it is no longer subject to the entirety of the
Convention.
46. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5, art. 154, discussing the relationship between
the Geneva and Hague texts.
47. See, e.g., id., art. 47.
48. Roberts, supra note 15, at 616.
49. Id.
50. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 173.
51. S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
52. DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 273 (the occupation ended “only ‘notionally’”). While
Sassòli agrees that this was the legal effect of Resolution 1546, he criticizes it and calls it a “dangerous precedent.” Marco Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by
Occupying Powers, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 661, 684 (2005).
53. It is hard to point at a specific time when that happened. The assumption of authority
was gradual, just as the occupation did not end overnight. See Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 27, 46 (2005), discussing
Iraq’s status after June 28, 2003 (“The Interim Government, while exercising a wide range of governmental decision-making powers, is constrained in key respects by its essentially caretaker
character, the formal restrictions as regards ‘taking any decisions affecting Iraq’s destiny’, the
limitations on its treaty-making powers, and its weaknesses in certain areas when compared to
the position of external powers in Iraq”).
54. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on the Unilateral Termination of Occupation, in A WISER
CENTURY? JUDICIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, DISARMAMENT AND THE LAWS OF WAR 100 YEARS
AFTER THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 371, 379 (Thomas Giegerich ed., 2009).
55. For example, coalition forces must respect Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as well as Article 75 of Additional Protocol I (both providing fundamental guarantees), as
long as they continue to participate in an armed conflict.
56. American and British laws may bind American and British soldiers, respectively, even
when the soldiers are stationed abroad. See Justice Barak’s reasoning in HCJ 393/82 Jama’it
Askan Alma’amun v. Commander of IDF Forces [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 785, 810 (“Every Israeli soldier carries in his backpack the customary rules of public international law relating to the laws of
war, as well as the basic rules of Israeli administrative law”).
57. R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. The Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58,
¶ 39 [hereinafter Al-Jedda case].
58. Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08 (admissibility decision), ¶ 79, http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (“The applicants were detained and transferred by
United Kingdom forces solely on the basis of decisions taken unilaterally by the Iraqi courts”)
[hereinafter Al-Saadoon case]. The ECtHR had determined that this argument was not “material” to the admissibility decision, and would be discussed in relation to the merits of the case. See
id., ¶ 89.
59. CPA Order No. 54, Trade Liberalization Policy 2004 with Annex A (Feb. 24, 2004). All
CPA orders, regulations and memoranda are available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/
(then hyperlink by name of order, regulation or memorandum).
60. CPA Order No. 64, Amendment to the Company Law No. 21 of 1997 with Annex A (Feb.
29, 2004).
61. CPA Order No. 74, Interim Law on Security Markets (Apr. 18, 2004).
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62. CPA Order No. 78, Facilitation of Court-supervised Debt Resolution Procedures (Apr.
19, 2004).
63. CPA Order No. 80, Amendment to the Trademarks and Descriptions Law No. 21 of 1957
(Apr. 26, 2004).
64. CPA Order No. 83, Amendment to the Copyright Law (Apr. 29, 2004).
65. E.g., Roberts, supra note 15; Gregory Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEORGETOWN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (2005).
66. CPA Order No. 39, Foreign Investment (Sept. 19, 2003).
67. CPA Order No. 74, supra note 61.
68. CPA Order No. 56, Central Bank Law with Annex A (Feb. 24, 2004).
69. CPA Order No. 64, supra note 60.
70. CPA Regulation No. 6, Governing Council of Iraq (July 13, 2003). See also S.C. Res. 1511,
¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 6, 2003) (“the Governing Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which, without prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period until an
internationally recognized, representative government is established and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority”). The Governing Council was dissolved on June 1, 2004 (CPA Regulation No. 9, Governing Council’s Dissolution (June 9, 2004)) and replaced by the interim
government of Iraq (CPA Order No. 100, Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the CPA (June 28, 2004)).
71. CPA Order No. 39, supra note 66, pmbl.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. As articulated by CPA Order No. 78, supra note 62.
75. CPA Order No. 40, Bank Law with Annex A (Sept. 19, 2003).
76. CPA Order No. 39, supra note 66, pmbl.
77. Id.
78. See, for instance, CPA Orders No. 64, supra note 60; No. 74, supra note 61; No. 80, supra
note 63; No. 83, supra note 64.
79. CPA Order No. 80, supra note 63.
80. Theodore W. Kassinger & Dylan J. Williams, Commercial Law Reform Issues in the Reconstruction of Iraq, 33 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 217, 218–
19 (2004).
81. Or as the Attorney General put it in late March 2003, “[T]he imposition of major structural economic reforms would not be authorised by international law.” Kampfner, supra note
18.
82. Kayian Homi Kaikobad, Problems of Belligerent Occupation: The Scope of Powers Exercised
by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, April/May 2003–June 2004, 54 INTERNATIONAL &
COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 253, 260 (2005) (emphasis in original).
83. Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence, supra note 25 (“Whilst the introduction of democratic changes in government can not be imposed by the Occupying Powers, this
does not affect the rights of the Iraqi people themselves to develop their own systems of government. It is therefore permissible for the Occupying Powers to play a facilitating role in relation to
reforms genuinely undertaken by the people of Iraq themselves”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Fox, supra note 65, at 263.
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87. Hague Regulations, supra note 4, art. 43 (“The authority of the legitimate power having in
fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country”).
88. Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 646–47.
89. The occupant is required to ensure the humane treatment of protected persons, without
discriminating among them, and to respect, among other things, the protected persons’ honor,
family rights, religious convictions and practices, and manners and customs. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5, art. 27. Additionally, it is required to facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children (id., art. 51), provide specific labor
conditions (id., art. 52), ensure food and medical supplies to the population (id., art. 55), maintain medical services (id., art. 56), and agree to relief schemes and to facilitate them by all means
at its disposal (id., art. 59).
90. GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY ON
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 97 (1957); MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE
MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 224 (1959); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 767, 770 (1961); ODILE DEBBASCH,
L’OCCUPATION MILITAIRE: POUVOIRS RECONNUS AUX FORCES ARMÉES HORS DE LEUR
TERRITOIRE NATIONAL 172 (1962); LORD MCNAIR & ARNOLD DUNCAN WATTS, LEGAL EFFECTS
OF WAR 369 (1966). For a more conservative view, see Michael Bothe, Belligerent Occupation, in
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1982); RÜDIGER
WOLFRUM, DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 9 (2005).
91. Armed Activities case, supra note 12, ¶ 211.
92. ICJ (Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 44); ECtHR (Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No.
15318/89, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513 (1996) (merits) (the European Convention on Human Rights
applies to the part of Cyprus occupied by Turkey)); UN Human Rights Committee (Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18,
1998), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/israel1998.html).
93. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 44, at 70 (“the scope-of-application provisions of human
rights accords do not exclude their applicability in principle, even if they do, as noted below,
permit certain derogations in time of emergency”); ESTHER COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967–1982, at 28–29 (1985); BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at
187–89. But see Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian
Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 345, 350–52 (Theodor Meron ed., 1985)
(stipulating that most human rights exist in peacetime but may disappear completely in wartime; Dinstein later supported the simultaneous applicability of human rights law. See
DINSTEIN, supra note 27, 69–71).
94. DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 113 (an occupant may repeal existing legislation that is inconsistent with binding norms of international law such as Geneva Convention IV), 115 (the occupant may legislate “at the behest” of the local population), 116 (the occupant has a “right to
revise and even reform legislation in consonance with new developments”). Sassòli endorses an
expansive authority to legislate and he does so with the local population’s best interests in mind.
Aside from the usual exceptions to the conservationist principle, he supports occupant legislation that is “essential for the implementation of IHL [international humanitarian law]” and that
realizes human rights law or maintains civil life (Sassòli, supra note 52, at 675–77). In his view,
[t]he occupying power . . . has an obligation to abolish legislation and institutions
which contravene international human rights standards. . . . [I]t may introduce only as
many changes as is absolutely necessary under its human rights obligations and must
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stay as close as possible to similar local standards and the local cultural, legal and
economic traditions.
Id. at 676–77.
95. Roberts, supra note 15, at 620. One such scenario is when “the occupant and/or international bodies properly refer to human rights law as providing a legal basis for changing certain
laws of the occupied territory, or even as setting goals for a transformative occupation.” Id. at 601.
96. Id. at 600.
97. Melissa Patterson, Note, Who’s Got the Title? or, The Remnants of Debellatio in Post-Invasion
Iraq, 47 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 467 (2006).
98. CPA Order No. 1, De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society (May 16, 2003). See also CPA
Memorandum No. 1, Implementation of De-Ba’athification Order No. 1 (June 3, 2003).
99. Fox, supra note 65, at 277.
100. An alternative basis for the applicability of international human rights treaties in occupied territories would be the law of occupation itself. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires the occupant to respect “the laws in force in the country.” To the extent that international
treaties, including human rights treaties, form part of the local law, the occupant is bound to respect them as well. Hague Regulations, supra note 4, art. 43.
101. That did not keep the CPA from taking human rights considerations into account—e.g.,
CPA Order No. 19, Freedom of Assembly (July 9, 2003) (“Determined to remove the unacceptable restrictions on human rights of the former Iraqi Ba`ath Party regime . . .”).
102. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
reprinted in 6 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 368 (1967).
103. United States Department of Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational
Considerations 6 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/detainees/working
_grp_report_detainee_interrogations.pdf. See also Brief for Appellees at 41–42, Al Odah v. U.S.,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-5251), available at http://www.aclu.org/hrc/Post911
_AlAdah_v_US.pdf.
104. Press Release, U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva, General Comments of the United
States on Basic Principles and Guideline on the Right to a Remedy for Victims of Violations of
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Aug. 15, 2003), cited in Michael J. Kelly,
Critical Analysis of the International Court of Justice Ruling on Israel’s Security Barrier, 29
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 181, 205 (2005).
105. The government maintained that the ECHR was “intended to apply in a regional context in the legal space of the Contracting States.” Letter from Adam Ingram, MP, UK Armed
Forces Minister, to Adam Price, MP (Apr. 7, 2004), cited in Ralph Wilde, The Applicability of International Human Rights Law to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Foreign Military
Presence in Iraq, 11 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 485, 488–89
(2005). On that basis, the United Kingdom argued that, although it was an occupying power in
Iraq, it did not possess the needed degree of effective control for the ECHR to apply, and that
there was no general doctrine of “personal jurisdiction” in relation to the ECHR. Al-Skeini and
others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2004] EWHC 2911, ¶ 287 [hereinafter Al-Skeini
[2004]]. Later, the United Kingdom maintained that its actions in Iraq were attributable to the
United Nations, thereby absolving it of any responsibility under the ECHR (Al-Jedda case, supra
note 57, at ¶ 3, ¶ 49).
106. Al-Skeini [2004], supra note 105, ¶ 287; Al-Skeini and others v. Secretary of State for
Defence [2007] UKHL 26, ¶ 132.
107. Al-Saadoon case, supra note 58, ¶ 88.
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108. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 27, ¶ 4.
109. Id., ¶ 5.
110. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg. at 11–12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761 (May 22, 2003).
111. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 27, ¶ 4.
112. Id., ¶ 8.
113. Eyal Benvenisti, Water Conflicts during the Occupation of Iraq, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 860, 863 (2004).
114. For the rise of human rights in international law, see THEODOR MERON, THE
HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). For an evolutionary interpretation of treaties,
see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21); World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ¶¶ 129–30, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12,
1998); RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 251–56 (2008).
115. For a discussion of derogation from jus cogens rights by the Council, see Case T-315/1,
Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of European Union and European Commission, [2005] ECR II3649, ¶ 230; Erika De Wet, The Role of Human Rights in Limiting the Enforcement Power of the
Security Council: A Principled View, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 7,
22 (Erika De Wet et al. eds., 2003); Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the
Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United
Nations?, 46 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 309, 322 (1997). See also Marten
Zwanenburg, Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the Law of Occupation,
86 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 745, 760–66 (2004). But see GREG FOX,
HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 211–13 (2008).
116. For the principle of self-determination as an erga omnes obligation, see East Timor (Port.
v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30). For the principle as also a jus cogens right, see Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session 113, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No.
10, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf; ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES:
A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 320 (1995).
117. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 213–14.
118. Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 623.
119. See also Yehuda Z. Blum, UN Membership of the “New” Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?,
86 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 830, 833 (1992) (“Yugoslavia has been suspended from the General Assembly, pending reconsideration of the matter by the Council . . ., in
a manner not foreseen by the Charter . . .”).
120. On these, see RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: HOW
TRUSTEESHIP AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT AWAY (2008); CARSTEN STAHN, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: VERSAILLES TO IRAQ
AND BEYOND (2008).
121. While the United States and the United Kingdom were both occupants in Iraq and permanent members of the Council, their interests were balanced by the presence of other permanent members, most notably China and Russia.
122. The occupants were merely “encourage[d]” to “inform the [Security] Council at regular
intervals of their efforts . . .” (S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 27, ¶ 24). There is no evidence of such
regular notifications.
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123. Memorandum Opinion from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, to the
Counsel to the President, “Protected Person” Status in Occupied Iraq under the Fourth Geneva
Convention (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/2004/gc4mar18.pdf.
124. Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, to William H.
Taft, General Counsel, Department of State, Re: Draft Opinion Concerning Permissibility of Relocating Certain “Protected Persons” in Occupied Iraq (Mar. 19, 2004), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/doj_memo031904.pdf; Leila Nadya Sadat,
Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under International Law, 37 CASE
WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 324–38 (2006); David Weissbrodt &
Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295, 320–43 (2007).
125. Michael Ottolenghi, The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: The Implications for the
International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 72 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 2177, 2205–10 (2004)
(discussing the use of Iraqi oil); Frederick Lorenz, Strategic Water for Iraq: The Need for Planning
and Action, 24 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 275, 280, 285, 296–98 (2008); Amy
Hardberger, Whose Job Is It Anyway? Governmental Obligations Created by the Human Right to
Water, 41 TEXAS JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 533, 561–63 (2006).
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